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JUDICIAL MESSAGING: REMOTE TEXTER LIABILITY AS
PUBLIC EDUCATION

I. INTRODUCTION

In an August 2013 case of national first impression, the New Jersey
Superior Court held that "one who is texting from a location remote
from the driver of a motor vehicle can be liable to [third parties]
injured because the driver was distracted by the text.,,1 The remote
texter will be liable if the accident was caused by texting and if that
remote texter "knows, or has special reason to know, [that] the
recipient will view the text while driving" and thus be distracted. 3
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Kubert fast became the object of ridicule
among legal commentators and in news coverage.
Distracted driving is an epidemic that plagues the nation. Polls
suggest that the current traffic safety culture is one of indifference,
founded upon drivers' "do as I say, not as I do" attitude. 4 At any
given moment, 660,000 drivers are using cell phones and electronic
devices while driving. 5 Studies show that distracted driving, which
enhances the risk of a car accident by three times,6 is more dangerous
than drinking and driving. 7
1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

6.

7.

Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214,1218-19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). New Jersey
motor vehicle and criminal statutes provide penalties for those who use their cell
phone while driving, but neither statutory nor case law directly address penalties for
the remote sender of the text. !d. at 1218.
Texter has been recognized in the Collins English Dictionary, defined as "a person
who communicates by text messaging." Definition of "Texter," COLLINS ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, http://www.collinsdictionary.comldictionarylEnglishitexter (last visited
Apr. 10,2015).
Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1221.
Bruce C. Hamilton et aI., Distracted and Risk-Prone Drivers, AAA FOUND. FOR
TRAFFIC SAFETY 2 (Jan. 2013), https:llwww.aaafoundation.org/sites/defaultifiles/
Distracted%20and%20Risk%20Prone%20Drivers%20FINAL.pdf.
See Timothy M. Pickrell & Tony Jianqiang Ye, Driver Electronic Device Use in 2011,
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. I (Apr. 2013), http://wwwnrd.nhtsa.dot.govlPubs/811719.pdf.
New VTTl Study Results Continue to Highlight the Dangers of Distracted Driving,
VA. TECH TRANS. INST. (May 29, 2013), http://www.vtti.vt.eduifeaturedl052913cellphone.html.
See Philip LeBeau, Texting and Driving Worse than Drinking and Driving, CNBC
(June 25, 2009, II :54 AM), http://www.cnbc.comlidl31545004. CNBC and Car and
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Handling a cell phone while driving is a temptation for people of
all ages and demographics. As attorneys, we check our email,
discuss client matters on the phone, and even send and receive
faxes-all while driving on congested highways or through
neighborhoods where children play in the streets. We must take a
step back and reexamine the life in which we consciously and
unconsciously participate. Today's society is apathetic to the risks
involved with distracted driving. Public service announcements, peer
discussion, and even the prospect of a traffic ticket have failed to
stem this serious hazard.
Could the threat of civil liability
accomplish what all of these conventional approaches to public
education have not?
Liability rules do more than compensate the victims of harm for
their injuries. "When the decisions of the courts become known, and
defendants realize that they may be held liable, there is of course a
strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of the harm."s By
educating people about both the hazards of their conduct and its
potential liability consequences, tort law admonishes would-be
wrongdoers, and thus induces at least some of them to take greater
care. In this way, liability rules serve a prophylactic, as well as a
compensatory, purpose.
This Comment defends Kubert v. Best, and remote texter liability
more generally, as a valuable instrument of public education about a
novel and serious public safety problem, and as an appropriate
example of judicial innovation. 9 Part II provides a factual and legal
overview of Kubert v. Best. lO Part III then analyzes the legal
concepts at issue: evolving the common law, aligning moral
culpability with legal responsibility, and preventing foreseeable
harm. I I
The Comment further seeks to show that Kubert exemplifies
appropriate judicial innovation. 12 Part IV promotes Kubert-style
liability as a desirable means of raising public consciousness and
suggests that many jurisdictions will adopt this extension of

8.

9.
10.
11.
12.

Driver Magazine partnered to test brake time reaction for drivers in various
conditions. Driving 70 mph, an unimpaired driver takes .54 seconds to brake, a
legally drunk (.08 HAC) driver takes an additional 4 feet, a driver reading an email
takes an additional 36 feet, and a driver sending a text takes an additional 70 feet. Id.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 25 (5th
ed. 1984).
See discussion infra Parts II-V.
See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Parts IV-V.
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liability. 13 Part V addresses objections, and then argues that the
enormous benefit of societal education outweighs the minute added
liability. 14
II. UNDERSTANDING THE UNDERPINNINGS OF KUBERT V
BEST

A.

Factual Background

On the afternoon of September 21, 2009, David and Linda Kubert
were riding their motorcycle in Mine Hill Township, New Jersey.IS
As the Kuberts were rounding a bend, "a pick-up truck ... driven ...
by eighteen-year-old Kyle Best crossed the double center line" into
the Kubert's lane of trave1. 16 After an unsuccessful attempt to evade
the collision, the truck and motorcycled collided.17 David's left leg
was nearly severed and Linda's left leg was shattered, "leaving her
fractured thighbone protruding [from her] skin" as the Kuberts laid
injured in the road. 18 Best, a volunteer fireman, did his best to aid the
Kuberts until medical responders arrived, but both victims lost their
left leg as a result of the accident. 19
The Kuberts' attorney gathered evidence of Best's cell phone
activity on the day of the accident, which showed 62 texts between
Best and his 17-year-old friend, Shannon Colonna, on the day of the
accident. 20 Colonna texted Best at 5 :48: 14 p.m., Best responded at
5:48:23 p.m. and 5:48:58 p.m., then Colonna texted back at 5:49:07
p.m., just before Best placed the 911 call at 5:49: 15 p.m. 21 Seventeen
seconds passed between Best texting Colonna and the 911 call; those
seventeen seconds had to include Best stopping his truck, getting out,
seeing the gravity of the injuries, and calling 911.22 The judge
inferred that the teenagers' texting distracted Best, causing him to
collide with the Kuberts' motorcycle. 23
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.
18.
19.
20.

21.
22.

23.

See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part V.
Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1219 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
ld.
ld. at 504.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld. at 1220 (admitting into evidence a chart indicating the exact times of each text).
ld.
See id. at 1220-21. Cell phone records show that Best resumed texting with Colonna
at 5:55:30 p.m., and that Best texted Colonna after he began driving home. Id. at
1221.
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Procedural Posture and Holdings

The Kuberts brought claims for compensation against both Best
and Colonna, alleging the accident was caused by distractions created
by the texters; Best settled and the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Colonna, on the ground that she had no legal
duty to avoid texting Best, even if she knew he was driving.24 On
appeal, the Kuberts challenged the dismissal of claims against
Colonna, urging that if a jury found her texting to be a proximate
cause of the accident, then she should be liable for aiding and
abetting Best's unlawful texting while driving. 25 The Kuberts further
asserted that Colonna "had an independent duty to avoid texting to a
person who [she knew] was driving" and that, based on the
timestamps of the texts, a jury could infer that Colonna knew Best
was driving home from work when she texted him less than a minute
before the accident. 26
The appellate court agreed that Colonna did have a legal duty to not
distract Best while he was driving, declaring that "a person sending
text messages has a duty not to text someone who is driving if the
. texter knows, or has special reason to know, the recipient will view
the text while driving.'>27 Nonetheless, the Kuberts were unable to
produce sufficient evidence to prove that Colonna knew or had
special reason to know that Best was driving during their text
conversation; therefore, the appellate court affirmed summary
judgment in favor of Colonna. 28
C.

The Kubert Court's Journey To Defining The Duty Owed By A
Remote Texter

To recover for negligence, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant
breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff, and that the breach
caused actual compensatory injuries to the plaintiff. 29
In analyzing whether a remote texter owes a duty of care to those
who may be harmed when the text recipient-driver is distracted, the
New Jersey Superior Court examined case law, including analogous
precedent from various jurisdictions, and the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.30 There is a long-standing duty to not interfere with a
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.atI218,1221.
Id. at 1221.
Id.
Id.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL

Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1222-27.

& EMOTIONAL HARM § 6 emt. b (2010).
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driver's operation of the motor vehicle. 3l Passengers who actively
encourage unsafe actions by a driver may be jointly liable for
resulting harm,32 while mere presence in a negligent driver's vehicle
or failure to prevent unsafe conduct is, in most jurisdictions,
insufficient to establish that a passenger aided and abetted the
driver's negligence. 33 Generally, to establish a duty upon passengers,
they must satisfy either of two conditions. First, the plaintiff could
establish that the passenger had a special relationship with the driver
or the passenger actively encouraged the driver's negligent conduct. 34
A special relationship involves an element of control, such as parentchild, common carrier-passenger, employer-employee, or landownerinvitee. 35 Second, the plaintiff can prove that the passenger actively
encouraged the driver's negligent conduct. Active encouragement
entails affirmative acts on the part of the passenger, thus creating a
situation where a passenger could aid and abet the driver's negligent
actions. 36
The Kubert holding endorsed these conditions as separate avenues
for imposing liability on the remote texter and acknowledged that
Colonna satisfied neither: Colonna did not have a special relationship
with Best nor did she actively encourage Best to text while driving. 37
With the contents of the text messages unknown to the court, it could
not be shown that Colonna knew Best was driving, therefore a jury
could not find that Colonna aided and abetted. 38 The court provided
31.

32.

33.
34.

35.
36.

37.
38.

8 AM. JUR. 2d Automobiles § 703 (2014). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 876 cmt. a(2) (1979) (stating that two speeding drivers are both liable to an
injured party).
E.g., Sloan v. Fauque, 784 P.2d 895, 895 (Mont. 1989) (encouraging driver to
continue chase of another vehicle); Aebischer v. Reidt, 704 P.2d 531, 532 (Or. 1985)
(refilling marijuana pipe for driver warranted imposing liability on that passenger);
Hood v. Evans, 126 S.E.2d 898,899-90 (Ga. 1962) (holding liable the passenger who
signaled the start of a drag race).
E.g., Edwardson v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 589 N.W.2d 436, 439-40 (Wisc. Ct.
App.1998).
Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1224 (citing Champion ex reI. Ezzo v. Dunfee, 939 A.2d 825, 829
-30 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008)). But see Adams v. Morris, 584 S.W.2d 712,
716-17 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (finding that passengers may owe a common law duty
of reasonable care to all others on the roadway).
Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 125 P.3d 906, 909 (Utah 2005).
See Beth Holliday, Cause of Action Against Motor Vehicle Passenger to Recover for
Injury Sustained in Accident, 61 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 1, § 3 Alternative Actions
(2014).
Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1224. In this case, it was not argued that Colonna had a special
relationship with Best-the only condition at issue was active encouragement. Id.
Id. at 1229.
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that, even under the assumption that Colonna's texts were phrased to
require responses, the act of sending text messages does not, by itself,
constitute active encouragement of texting while driving. 39 Colonna
could not actively encourage Best to text while driving if she did not
know Best was driving. 40
The Kubert court consciously defined the duty owed by a remote
texter as a narrow one. It recognized that "courts must be careful not
to 'create a broadly worded duty and . . . run the risk of
unintentionally imposing liability in situations far beyond the
parameters we now face. ",41 It therefore limited a text sender's duty
to circumstances in which the sender knows or has special reason to
know that the recipient: (1) is driving; and (2) will read and respond
to the message. 42
III. DOCTRINAL GROUNDINGS OF THE KUBERT HOLDING
The Kubert court expressed dire concern about the lack of public
consciousness regarding the deadly epidemic of texting while
driving. 43 In an effort to promote public awareness of the gravity of
potential harm, the court appropriately exercised its authority to
create civil liability where statutes had proven ineffective. The
Kubert court interpreted the negligence elements of duty and
proximate cause to support a legal responsibility for risks that people
know or should know they are creating. 44 Because duty and
proximate cause operate in all common law states as the primary
doctrinal impediments to third-party liability for negligent driving,
the Kubert analysis has nationwide implications. 45

A.

Statutory Influence, Or Lack Thereof

Courts have traditionally had authority to decide issues of first
impression in the absence of a controlling statute. 46 Such judge-made
law creates a binding rule or standard that is then incorporated into

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

46.

Id.
[d. at 1224.
[d. at 1227 (quoting Estate of Desir ex rei. Estiverne v. Vertus, 69 A.3d 1247, 1258
(2013)).
[d. at 1218-19.
[d. at 1229.
[d. at 1226-28.
Peggy Wright, Text Sender Could Be Civilly Liable for N.J. Wreck, USA TODAY
(Aug. 29, 2013, 1:31 PM), http://www.usatoday.comlstory/news/nationl2013/08/29/
texting-driving-crash-ru1ing-njl2727549lhtm.
See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 376 (1982).
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the governing body of law. 47 "If civil liability is appropriate to
effectuate the purposes of a statute, courts are not denied this
traditional remedy because it is not specifically authorized [by
statute]. ,,48
Prior to this case, New Jersey had one statute in place, N.J. STAT.
ANN. 39:4-97.3, prohibiting texting while driving. This law makes it
illegal to use a cell phone that is not hands-free while operating a
motor vehicle, except in a few specifically described emergency
instances. 49 Interestingly, effective July 1, 2014, 50 percent of the
fines imposed on those who violate this statute are allocated to the
State, and shall be used for public education, including "infonning
motorists of the dangers of texting while driving.,,50 Furthermore, in
response to Kubert, New Jersey amended its criminal assault statute
in 2012 to add N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:12-1(c)(1), dubbed the "Kulesh,
Kubert, and Bolis Law.,,51 This new law provides criminal penalties
for those who use a cell phone while driving and injure others. 52
47.
48.
49.

50.

51.
52.

See id.
Id.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 39:4-97.3 (West Supp. 2014) (amended July I, 2014) states in
pertinent part:
a. The use of a wireless telephone or electronic communication
device by an operator of a moving motor vehicle on a public road
or highway shall be unlawful except when the telephone is a
hands-free wireless telephone or the electronic communication
device is used hands-free ....
h. The operator of a motor vehicle may use a hand-held wireless
telephone while driving with one hand on the steering wheel only
if:
(I) The operator has reason to fear for his life or safety, or
believes that a criminal act may be perpetrated against
himself or another person; or
(2) The operator is using the telephone to report to
appropriate authorities a fire, a traffic accident, a serious
road hazard or medical or hazardous materials emergency,
or to report the operator of another motor vehicle who is
driving in a reckless, careless or otherwise unsafe manner
or who appears to be driving under the influence of alcohol
or drugs.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 39:4-97.3(f) (West Supp. 2014). Prior to July I, 2014, the statute
provided only that the State "shall develop and undertake a program to notify and
inform the public as to the provisions of this act." The amended statute allocates the
other 50 percent of fines to the municipality in which the offense occurred. Id.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-I(c)(I) (West Supp. 2014); see also Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d
1214, 1218 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:12-I(c)(I) states in pertinent part:
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Creating A Common Law Duty

The duty element serves as a gatekeeper and must be established to
succeed on a negligence claim. 53 By defining the obligation that one
person owes another, duty "constrains and channels behavior in a
socially responsible way before the fact, and it provides a basis for
jUdging the propriety of behavior thereafter.,,54 Determining the
scope of duty in negligence claims has long been a judiciary
function. 55
The court considers whether a plaintiffs interests deserve legal
protection from a defendant's conduct. 56 In doing so, courts use duty
to balance competing interests: the security of the class of potential
victims versus the freedom of action of the class of actors. 57 When
the actor's chosen conduct creates a risk of harm to others, the court
may determine the appropriateness of the conduct by weighing the
importance of the actor's goal against the risk of harm such an act
imposes on others. 58 Under Kubert, a person who texts a driver
knowing that the driver will be distracted by the text effectively
chose to create risk to the recipient and others on the road. 59 The
remote texter's decision to text the driver is deemed inappropriate
because the texter's interest in communicating a message to the
driver will almost always be outweighed by the increased likelihood
of an auto accident. 60 For example, the texter's desire to ask the

53.
54.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

60.

A person is guilty of assault by auto or vessel when the person
drives a vehicle or vessel recklessly and causes either serious
bodily injury or bodily injury to another. Assault by auto or vessel
is a crime of the fourth degree if serious bodily injury results and
is a disorderly persons offense if bodily injury results. Proof that
the defendant was operating a hand-held wireless telephone while
driving a motor vehicle in violation of section 1 of P.L. 2003, c.
310 (C. 39:4-97.3) may give rise to an inference that the
defendant was driving recklessly.
David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1671, 1674
(2007).
ld. at 1674-75 (citing David G. Owen, Duty Rules, 54 VAND. L. REv. 767, 767-79
(2001)).
Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1226 (N.J. 1984).
Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1227-28 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (citing J.S. v.
R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924, 928 (N.J. 1998)).
Owen, supra note 53, at 1675.
See id. at 1678.
Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1227-29.
See id. at 1222-23.
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driver what s/he wants for dinner does not warrant tripling the risk of
a car accident. 61
Courts have authority to establish a common law duty of care,62 and
typically define that duty with reference to notions of basic fairness
and consideration of public policy.63 Courts weigh the relationship of
the parties, the associated risk, the opportunity and ability to use care,
and the public interest in the outcome, with the goal of developing a
"generally applicable rules to govern societal behaviors.,,64 This is a
judicial undertaking that looks well beyond the particular facts and
parties before the court that day.65
C.

Proximate Cause As A Judicial Tool, Not A Bright-Line Rule

The element of proximate cause is similarly informed by public
policy.66 "[P]roximate cause is an 'elusive butterfly' that e'er evades
a net of rules.,,67 Cause-in-fact addresses the factual connection
between the breach of duty and the injury, whereas proximate cause
speaks to "whether in logic, fairness, policy, and practicality, the
defendant ought to be held legally accountable for the plaintiff's
harm that in some manner is 'remote' from the defendant's breach.,,68
This element of negligence, though essential for liability,69 cannot be
boiled down to hard set of rules, let alone a single name; 70 rather,
61.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

67.

68.
69.
70.

See generally New VITI Study Results Continue to Highlight the Dangers of
Distracted Driving, supra note 6 (examining statistical data on the risks associated
with cell phone use while driving).
See, e.g., Wilson v. Copen, 244 F.3d 178,181 n.1 (ist Cir. 2001).
Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1223 (citing Estate of Desir ex. reI. Estiveme v. Vertus, 69 A.3d
1247,1258 (N.J. 2013)).
See id. (quoting Vertus, 69 A.3d at 1258).
See id. (quoting Vertus, 69 A.3d at 1258).
Ashley Cnty., Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 671 (8th Cir. 2009) ("Proximate
cause is bottomed on public policy as a limitation on how far society is willing to
extend liability for a defendant's actions.").
KEETON, ET AL., supra note 8, § 41, at 264 (explaining that proximate cause reflects
"ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively possible and
convenient"); Owen, supra note 53, at 1682.
Owen, supra note 53, at 1681.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 6 cmt. b at 79-80
(2010).
At times, courts refer to proximate cause as "legal cause," yet also reference
proximate cause as encompassing both factual and legal causation, thereby creating
mounds of confusion. Owen, supra note 53, at 1682. To assuage this confusion and
to better exemplify its meaning, the Restatement (Third) of Torts replaces "proximate
cause" with "scope of liability." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 6 at 492, Special Note on Proximate Cause.
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proximate cause is a judicial tool used to define the scope of potential
liability.71 Founded in the concept of foreseeability, proximate cause
analysis allows a court to examine specific factual and legal issues
from comprehensive policy and common-sense perspective.72 The
relevant inquiry is whether, at the time the choice of action was
made, the actor should have contemglated the class of resulting injury
as a plausible result of their action. "[P]rior incidents or other facts
evidencing risks may make certain risks foreseeable that otherwise
were not, thereby changing the scope-of-liability analysis.,,74

D. Proximate Cause Satisfied Through Public Policy And Common
Sense
As the Kubert court explained, the sender of a text may reasonably
"assume that the recipient will read a text message only when it is
safe and legal to do so, that is, when not operating a vehicle.'>7S
"However, if the sender knows that the recipient is both driving and
will read the text immediately, then the sender has taken a
foreseeable risk in sending a text at that time.,,76 Fairness to the
public requires that the sender be held responsible for such scienter.
In its proactive expansion of liability, the Kubert court
appropriately honored the duty and proximate cause doctrines in
order to develop the common law in response to social and
technological change.
IV. REMOTE TEXTER LIABILITY TO RAISE PUBLIC
CONSCIOUSNESS

Kubert-style liability may serve as public education when other
means fail to adequately address a pressing issue. The legal
landscape is perpetually adjusting to the speed of technological
innovation and the omnipresence of technology in our daily lives. 77
From the industrial era to the modem digital age, courts have

71.
72.
73.
74.

75.

76.
77.

Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).
See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1223 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (quoting
Estate of Desir ex. reI. Estiverne v. Vertus, 69 A.3d 1247, 1258 (N.l. 2013)).
Owen, supra note 53, at 1683.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §
29 emt. d.
Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1227.
Id.
See John G. Browning, Emerging Technology and Its Impact on Automotive
Litigation, 81 DEF. COUNS. J. 83, 83-84 (2014).
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wrestled to adapt time-honored doctrines to our ever-developing
world. 78

A.

Pervasive Disjunction Between Awareness And Conduct

Automotive litigation demonstrates the misaligned relationship
between new technology and established legal concepts. 79 The ability
to instantly communicate with others has bred an electronic tethering
to one's friends, family, and work; 14,100,000,000 texts are sent per
day in the United States 80 and at any given moment, 660,000 drivers
are using cell phones and electronic devices while driving. 81 Studies
show that distracted driving, which enhances the risk of a car
accident by three times,82 is more dangerous than drinking and
driving.83
The U.S. Department of Transportation analyzes three main types
of distraction: manual, visual, and cognitive. 84 Texting while driving
engages all three types simultaneously, making it the most dangerous
of distractions. 8s In 2012, about 421,000 people were injured in
motor vehicle crashes involving a distracted driver. 86
There is a troubling disjuncture between the perceived threat to
public safety and the actual actions taken toward curbing the threat.
Accidents are the fifth leading cause of death in the United States. 87
The majority of Americans believe that distracted driving is a bigger
problem today than three years ago; the same sample group did not
78.

79.
80.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See, e.g., Great N. Ry. Co. v. Cahill, 253 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1920) (evaluating cases of
first impression regarding duties in the railroad context); Bridge Proprietors v.
Hoboken Co., 68 U.S. 116, 147 (1863) (describing the invention of the steam engine
as a massive difficulty for the legal system); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162
N.E. 99, 100-01 (N.Y. 1928) (discussing the development of the concept of
foreseeability and its impact on negligence law).
Browning, supra note 77, at 83.
See
Text
Message
Statistics,
STATISTIC BRAIN (June
18,
2013),
http;llstatisticbrain.comltext-message-statistics/ (showing that from June 2011 to June
2012, the average number of texts sent per month in the United States was
423,000,000,000).
What is Distracted Driving?, DISTRACTION.GOV, http;llwww.distraction.gov/statsresearch-Iaws/facts-and-statistics.html (last visited Apr. 10,2015).
ld.
See LeBeau, supra note 7.
What is Distracted Driving?, supra note 81.
ld.
ld.
The Editors of Publ'ns Int'!, 15 Most Common Causes of Death in the United States,
HOWSTUFFWORKS, http;//health.howstuffworks.comldiseases-conditions/death-dying!
15-most-common-causes-of-death-in-the-united-states.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).
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feel that impaired driving, traffic congestion, and aggressive driving
posed a similarly growing threat. 88
On the other hand, polls suggest that the current traffic safety
culture is one of indifference, founded upon drivers' "do as I say, not
as I do" attitude. 89 Nearly all drivers view texting while driving as
completely unacceptable, and seven out of eight drivers do perceive
social disapproval for texting while driving.90 Yet two out of three
people report using their cell phone "while driving within the past
month;,,91 one in four people admit to sending a text while driving in
the past month; and one in three admit to reading a text while driving
in the past month.92 Further, about "1 in 3 Americans have had a
friend or relative seriously injured or killed in a [car] crash.,,93 In
spite of the public's evident awareness of the problem, however, "less
than half (44.6%) [of drivers] support an outright ban on using any
type of cell phone (including hands-free) while driving.,,94 These
statistics are not reserved for the teen population, as many may
suspect. Rather, adult drivers reported using their phones or texting
while driving substantially more often than high school-aged teens. 95
Statistics confirm the indifference that is readily apparent in our
daily lives: people shamelessly admit to using their cell phones while
driving, despite awareness of the rampant danger. As a mechanism
for moving the public consciousness, the New Jersey Superior Court
proactively expanded the existing statutory liability to include remote
senders of text messages, i.e., those who aid and abet texting while
driving. 96

88.

89.
90.

91.

92.
93.
94.
95.

96.

See 2013 Traffic Safety Culture Index, AAA FOUND. FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY 14 (Jan.
2014), https:llwww .aaafoundation.org/sitesldefaultifiles/TSCI%2020 13 %20Final%20
FTS%20Fonnat.pdf.
Hamilton et aI., supra note 4, at 4.
2013 Traffic Safety Culture Index, supra note 88, at 3. ("Nearly all drivers view
texting or emailing while driving as a very serious threat to their own personal safety .
. . .").
Teens Report Texting or Using Phone While Driving Significantly Less Often Than
Adults, AAA NEwsRoOM (Dec 11, 2013), http://newsroom.aaa.coml2013112/teensreport-texting-or-using-phone-while-driving-significantIy-1ess-often-than-adults/.
Hamilton et aI., supra note 4, at 3.
2013 Traffic Safety Culture Index, supra note 88, at 3.
Id.
Teens Report Texting, supra note 91 (finding that "[fJorty-three percent of adults ages
25-39" reported using their phone "fairly often or regularly while driving, compared
to only 20 percent of teens").
See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
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Courts Can Play A Pivotal Role In Raising Awareness

While legislatures throughout the nation have been enacting civil
and criminal statutes to address specific modes of distracted driving,
such lawmaking tends to lag behind the technology it seeks to
regulate. 97 Most communication takes place through digital
messaging, be it text or email, rather than actual conversation.
Therefore, while effective in their narrow scope, the laws already in
place are not sufficient to combat the epidemic of distracted driving,
especially texting while driving.
The Kubert holding reflects the actual dangers of texting while
driving. Derived from criminal statutes imposing liability on texters
who cause injury, the Kubert court echoed the legislature'S view that
texting while driving is more than just negligent; rather, it is
reckless-a higher degree of subjective culpability.98
C.

Kubert-Style Liability: Coming Soon To A Jurisdiction Near You

Courts are well positioned to extend or reinterpret existing rules or
craft new law in response to new and emerging issues. Ideally, they
will adopt common law liability rules in dialogue with the legislature.
1.

Legislative Support For Judicial Extension

The Kubert court relied on existing state statutes and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts to justify their extension of liability.99
Presently, 44 states and the District of Columbia have bans on texting
while driving. lOo Most of these are primary laws-i.e., police may
stop a motorist for that offense alone. lOl Notwithstanding the national
trend toward enacting such prohibitions, there is a parallel trend of
not enforcing them. 102 States issue, on average, one ticket per day for
97.

See generally id. at 1218-19 (explaining that the distracted driving laws enacted thus
far by the legislature do not answer the issue presented in this case "whether one who
is texting from a location remote from the driver of a motor vehicle can be liable to
persons injured because the driver was distracted by the text").
98. See id. at 1229.
Id. at 1222-27.
99.
100. Distracted Driving: Cel/phones and Texting, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY (Mar.
20 IS),
http://www .iihs.orgliihs/topics/laws/cellphonelaws?topicName=distracteddriving (providing a table of state-by-state laws restricting cellphone use and texting,
including enforcement mechanisms).
101. Larry Copeland, FWIW. Few Drivers Nabbed by Texting Bans, USA TODAY (May S,
2013, 3 :39 PM), http://www.usatoday.comlstory/news/nationl20 13/0SIOSltextingdriving-bans-enforcement-tickets/213381S/html.
102. Id.
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violating cell phone laws. 103 Justin McNaull, director of state
relations for AAA and fonner Virginia police officer, defended such
under-enforcement on the ground that it takes time for police to
establish and propagate effective enforcement tactics. 104 McNaull
further explained that it is easier to issue citations for speeding or
failing to buckle a seatbelt, as those violations are readily apparent,
whereas a driver using a small cell phone is hard to SpOt. 105 McNaull
concluded: "Ultimately, the goal of traffic laws and traffic
enforcement isn't to write a certain number of tickets. It's to change
behavior. It's to discourage people from engaging in dangerous
behavior." 106
2.

Elastic Common Law Doctrines Facilitate Change

Duty exists where a court declares it does; as our ideas of
responsibility change with the times, so do the duties imposed by
courts. 107 Recently, courts have imposed new duties in response to
pervasive dangers that are foreseeable. 108 Virtually all jurisdictions
p'resently employ a foreseeability (or risk) standard for judging
proximate cause. 109 This standard has been the basis for imposing
civil liability for other serious but preventable threats to public
safety. 110
Although the specific duty announced in Kubert is novel, the
Kubert court in fact joined the broad trend in recent decades of using
the common law to incentivize or induce safer, more responsible
behavior. 111 For example, most jurisdictions now impose dram shop
liability, which recognizes a duty of care for a restaurant or bar that
continues to serve an obviously drunk patron who will later drive. 112
Today, dram shop laws are mostly codified, but the initial impetus for
recognizing such a duty came from the courts. 113 Dram shop liability
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 204 (Ariz. 1983) (en bane).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §
29 emt. e (2010); Owen, supra note 53, at 1685.
Id.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 29 emt. e.
See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1224-25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
Ross Sharkey, Note, Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC: Is It Time To Revise Montana's
Dram Shop Act?, 72 MONT. L. REv. 127, 129-30 (2011).
Ontiveros v. Bank, 667 P.2d 200, 209 (Ariz. 1983) (en bane) ("These holdings have
been translated into a finding of duty in common law .... ").
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extends a tavern owners' duty to protect patrons from other violent
patrons to a duty to protect the general public by ceasing to furnish
alcohol to an intoxicated patron. 114 Courts have compared reckless
over-serving of alcohol with a "put [ting] into the hands of an
obviously demented individual a firearm with which he shot an
innocent third person.,,115 Just as providing an insane person with a
firearm, or continuing to serve alcohol to a patron who is likely to
drive, irresponsibility enhances the risk of harm, so, too, does
willfully inducing a driver to text while driving. 116
Building on these established duties, scholars are proposing new
ways in which judicial initiative may serve to mitigate (or solve)
novel and seemingly incurable problems. For instance, Kubert-style
liability may be the next step in attacking the hot-button issue of
cyberbullying. Law Professor Elizabeth Jaffe, a national expert on
the legal response to bullying,117 advocates for expanding duty to
include webservers and web hosts-e.g., Facebook or Twitter-who
are in a position to proactively monitor their websites and cut off
sources of cyberbullying.118 Like the Kubert court, Jaffe purports to
turn a moral duty into a legal duty, thereby imposing liability on
those in control of reasonably foreseeable harm. 119 Embracing the
message in Kubert, Jaffe believes that the threat of civil liability will
incentivize web hosts to take affirmative steps to prevent harm from
occurring. 120
Using the law to effect social change is unique neither to
legislatures, nor to courts. Situations of aiding and abetting
dangerous behavior are appropriately combatted through judiciallyimposed law, just as was the case in Kubert.
114. Id. at 211.
115. Id. at 209 (citing Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 198 A.2d 550,553
(Pa. 1964».
116. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1229; LeBeau, supra note 7; see also Colo. Dog Fanciers, Inc. v.
City & Cnty. of Denver, 820 P.2d 644 (Colo. 1991) (en banc) (holding as
constitutional an ordinance banning pit bulls); Tracey v. Solesky, 50 A.3d 1075 (Md.
2012) (imposing strict liability on landlords of pit bull-owning tenants based on
inherent danger involved in a pit bull attack, thereby implying a moral duty not to aid
and abet the existence of pit bulls in domestic environments), superseded by statute,
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-1901 (2014).
117. See Elizabeth M Jaffe Faculty Biography, JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL,
http://www.johnmarshall.edulfacultystafflelizabeth-m-jaffe/ (last visited Jan. 17,
2015).
118. Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Imposing a Duty in an Online World: Holding the Webhost Liable
for Cyberbul/ying, 35 HASTINGS COMM. &ENT. L.J. 277,297 (2013).
119. Id. at 300--02.
120. Id. at 299.
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V. OBJECTIONS TO REMOTE TEXTER LIABILITY ARE
UNWARRANTED, AS IT PROVIDES EDUCATIONAL
BENEFIT IN EXCHANGE FOR LITTLE ADDED LIABILITY
On its face, Kubert may appear to threaten an exponential
expansion of liability for the simple act of sending a text message, an
action that occurs 14,100,000,000 times per day in the United
States. 121 However, such a fear is unwarranted. Kubert will not and
was not intended to result in significantly more liability. With very
few exceptions, the rule of Kubert does not apply to the wife who
texts her husband a grocery list to be viewed at the store later, or the
teenage boy who texts his girlfriend saying "Good luck on your test
today." Rather, Kubert aims to send a message (no pun intended) to
the general public: Texting is dangerous and kills people at a rate
comparable to drunk driving,122 so stop texting and driving!

A.

This Analysis Is Not Subject To The Superseding Cause Doctrine

A common objection to Kubert's expansion of liability is that the
recipient of the text, as the ultimate decision maker, should retain
sole liability for diverting their focus from the road to their phone. 123
Critics of Kubert argue that, even if texting a driver sometimes is
irresponsible, in the sense that the texter understands that slbe is
creating a risk of harm, the driver's decision to read and respond to
the text is the superseding cause of any accident, thus cutting off the
remote texter's chain of foreseeability. 124 This argument, though, is
incompatible with the purpose of the proximate cause element and is
also accounted for in the Kubert test.
First, the United States Supreme Court has expressly carved out
instances in which the closest temporal action to the harm is the sole
proximate cause. 125 A superseding cause exempts prior negligent
actions from liability because the "injury was actually brought about
by a later cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable.,,126
These intervening events sever the chain of causation, thus rendering
the prior cause remote. 127 "An intervening act may not be deemed a
121. See Text Message Statistics, supra note 80.
122. Wheeler v. Hruza, No. CIV 08-4087,2010 WL 2231959, at *3 (D.S.D. June 2, 2010)
("[R]ecent studies have shown that the probability of a vehicular collision is as great
for intoxicated drivers as for texting and cell phone use drivers.").
123. See Eugene Volokh, Liability for Texting Driver, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 30,
2013, 12:38 PM), http://www.volokh.coml20 13/08/30/liability-texting-driver/.
124. ld.
125. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S.Ct.1l86, 1192(2011).
126. Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837 (1996).
127. Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 326-27 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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superseding cause, however, if the intervening act was set in motion
by the initial act of negligence.,,128 Key to the analysis is the
independence of the final actor. 129 In the circumstance of texting, the
actions are concerted, not independent. 130 Therefore, the superseding
cause doctrine does not serve as legal insulation for the remote texter.
B.

Slippery Slope Is Not So Slippery

Kubert should not be read to suggest that one cannot distribute any
form of message to someone who is traveling without being
negligent. Most smartphones l31 notify receipt not only of text
messages, but also Facebook messages, Twitter replies, Snapchat
images, email, and voicemail messages. 132 Often, all message
notifications appear in the same or similar format, thereby creating
the same or similar level of distraction and foreseeable risk of hann
to others. The fact that a text message may be indistinguishable from
many other equally distracting message notifications naturally raises
the question of whether the Kubert rule can be limited to text
messagmg.
Although the Kubert court intended to expose only a narrow class
of texters to potential liability, this initial intention is no guarantee
that the scope will remain so confined. One might worry that future
courts, in their enthusiasm to effect social change through extension
of traditional tort law, could extend the logic of Kubert to a broader
category of remote texters, thus opening the floodgates for
litigation. 133
However, limits on liability for people who distract drivers are
already well established. Drivers are exposed to a miscellany of
distractions as they travel: stadium events, billboards, road signs,
128. Fletcher v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 406 F. App'x 785, 790 (4th Cir. 2011).
129. Id. at 790-91 (finding the sole proximate cause, despite the Pizza Hut employee's
negligent parking of car in traffic lane, to be another driver's decision to move around
the delivery car and run a red light); Hubbard v. Murray, 3 S.E.2d 397, 401-02 (Va.
1939) (finding independence of actions where, despite the bus driver's negligent
parking of the bus on the highway, the truck driver could have stopped his vehicle to
avoid the collision).
130. Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1224 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
131. "Smartphone" also includes tablets, PDAs, Blackberrys, and other text-enabled
communication devices.
132. See Dennis O'Reilly, How to Silence Notifications on Smartphones and Tablets,
CNET (Nov. 19,2012,4:47 PM), http://howto.cnet.comJ8301-11310_39-57551600285/how-to-silence-notifications-on-smartphones-and-tablets/.
133. Send a Text, Be Liable for a Car Crash, AMERICA'S FuTuRE, http://www.americasfuture.netl
courtmonitor/2013/2013-11-1O.html (last visited Feb. 3,2015).
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low-flying aircraft, cars stopped in the shoulder, accidents, holiday
decorations, and conspicuous pedestrians present habitual diversions
to driving. As discussed by the California Court of Appeals in 1993,
"[t]ravelers who, in the manner of Homer's ancient Argonauts, must
sail past Sirens, are obliged to exercise reasonable care in the
navigation of their craft and resist being seduced by sights and
sounds.,,134 Drivers have a duty to use reasonable care while
operating the vehicle, which includes being aware of potential
dangers and not allowing attractive sights to interfere with their
careful operation of the vehicle. 135
Although society accepts many distractions along the road, text
messaging is unique in both the ways it is used and the nature of the
distraction it presents. Stadium events, decorations, pedestrians, and
aircrafts are conducting business-as-usual, which is wholly unrelated
to the fact that people are simultaneously driving cars in the vicinity.
Billboards target drivers and passengers in cars, but do so generally,
as opposed to soliciting the attention of a specific driver. Accidents
on the road and cars in the shoulders are inevitable. Road signs
deliver pertinent messages that may require attention. In each of
these instances of general distraction, the blanket duty of reasonable
care that the law imposes on drivers is generally sufficient to induce
them to maintain their focus primarily on the road. In addition, these
kinds of general distractions tend to be very brief-typically a
fraction of a second; in contrast, reading and responding to a text
message requires much more sustained focus. 136
Texting a driver is different. A principal reason to text, as opposed
to call, is to deliver an ordinary message that can be viewed later at
one's convenience and when it is safe and appropriate to do so.
Further, text messaging has a personal aspect that is absent in the
above-mentioned distractions: a texter chooses the recipient of the
text message and directly communicates with that individual. The
risk-generating conduct involves specific action by two parties.
Moreover, there is a level of conscious awareness of the danger
before the action is made. The sender of the text message will
sometimes be aware of the hazard they are creating for a particular
driver. The joint culpability is now reflected in Kubert, which makes
such awareness an essential condition for liability. Lastly, the

l34. Lompoc Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 122, 128 (Ct. App.
1993).
l35. Id. at 125.
l36. See LeBeau, supra note 7.
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blanket duty on drivers to avoid temptations to divert their attention
has proven insufficient when applied to texting while driving.
Embracing Kubert does not threaten unbounded significant
expansion of liability; therefore, the societal value of Kubert' s thirdparty liability is not undermined by a slippery slope argument.
C.

Kubert Is Compatible With Traditional Tort Liability

Traditionally, tort liability principally seeks to compensate a
specific injured party.137 Tort liability has increasingly been used as a
catalyst for the evolution of public consciousness-a purpose long
associated with criminallaw. 138
If I were sitting in the passenger seat of your car, acting in a way
that I knew would likely distract you as the driver, and you
consequently got into an accident, both you and I would be liable. 139
The remote physical location of a sender of a text message who
nevertheless knowingly distracts a driver should not change the
analysis. This concept is also embodied in dram shop liability
laws. 140
This holding is consistent with traditional negligence liability:
persons have a duty to act (or not act, as in this case) reasonably
when their conduct foreseeably creates a risk of harm to others. 141
This duty does not cease just because the risk is produced through the
joint conduct of two separate actors. With foundations in traditional
tort principles, Kubert-style liability is narrowly crafted to outwit
superseding cause doctrines and slippery slope problems. In the
absence of any serious objections, remote texter liability brings the
enormous benefit of societal education for relatively little added
liability.

137. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 169 (2d Cir. 2010).
138. See Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1028 (1st Cir. 1973) ("Criminal
cases may be useful as guides to the type of conduct which the law will condemn or
excuse .... ").
139. Adams v. Morris, 584 S.W.2d 712, 715-16 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (finding that'a
passenger who distracted the driver was liable for breaching a standard of ordinary
care).
140. Larry Copeland, Horrific Ne. Crash Puts Spotlight on Dram Shop Laws, USA
TODAY (Nov. 28, 2012, 5:41 PM), http://www.usatoday.com!story/news/2012/11124/
dram-shop-laws/1660707 I.
141. Montgomery v. Nat'l Convoy & Trucking Co., 195 S.E. 247, 250-51 (S.c. 1938).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Delivery of the Kubert message was attempted prior to Kubert, 142
yet efforts have been in vain. 143 Therefore, in a plea to the general
public to cease an activity that causes rampant and unnecessary
deaths, the New Jersey Superior Court crafted a narrow test for
placing liability on the remote text sender who sends a text message
to a person who they know is driving, will view the text, and will
respond. l44 By design, the elements of the Kubert test will rarely be
met,145 as liability is only imposed on those remote texters with
knowledge that the recipient is driving and will view the text while
doing SO.146 Such a narrow test suggests that this holding strives to
discourage dangerous conduct, rather than rack up case after case of
tort liability and damages.
By grounding this prophylactic rule in traditional tort law, Kubertstyle liability may soon become law in many jurisdictions. As the
Kubert court explained:
Just as the public has learned the dangers of drinking and
driving through a sustained campaign and enhanced
criminal penalties and civil liability, the hazards of texting
when on the road, or to someone who is on the road, may
become part of the public consciousness when the liability
of those involved matches the seriousness of the harm. 147
Judicial innovation, as exemplified by the Kubert court, should be
embraced as a valuable tool for curing the disjuncture between public
awareness and conduct, with little added liability. Such proactive
expansions of liability can serve as catalysts for raising public
consciousness of serious societal problems, while evolving the
common law to align with social and technological changes.

142. See supra Part V.
143. See Wheeler v. Hruza, No. elY 08-4087, 2010 WL 2231959, at *3 (D.S.D. June 2,
2010) (explaining that a lack of public concern for the dangers of drivers using cell
phones, as compared to concern for intoxicated drivers, impacted its actionability).
144. Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214,1219 (N.l Super. App. Div. 2013).
145. The defendant in Kubert was found not liable due to a lack of evidence to satisfy the
test. Id. at 1224-25.
146. Id.at1219.
147. Id. at 1229.
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